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ABSTRACT
According to economic statecraft theory, states use investments
by state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) to achieve geopolitical
objectives, such as securing control over resources or exercising
influence in zones of special strategic interest. There is increasing
interest about the geopolitics of foreign investments under the
Chinese and Russian infrastructure diplomacy.
Geopolitical
investments pose a challenge to investment arbitration–a
mechanism created to depoliticize the resolution of investor-state
disputes. This article argues that, in the context of growing
economic power of SOEs and increasing geopolitical tensions,
geopolitics cannot and should not be excluded from the investment
arbitration process. At the jurisdictional stage, it makes sense to
focus on the commercial nature of investments in strategic sectors,
given the difficulty of establishing the real motivation of foreign
investors on the basis of objective criteria. However, on the merits,
geopolitical arguments are often the only basis on which host states
can substantiate their security concerns regarding foreign control
over strategic assets.
Excluding geopolitical analysis from
investment arbitration would negatively affect host states’ defense
of regulatory interference with strategic investments.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this article is to propose a new interdisciplinary
perspective to the study of investment arbitration based on the
theories of “economic statecraft” (i.e., the study of economic
activities as instruments of foreign policy)1 and “geopolitics” (i.e.,
the study of interstate competition for territory, resources, and
security).2 As highlighted by opposition to certain Chinese
investments in OECD countries, host states perceive the economic
power of SOEs from emerging economies as a potential risk to their
own national security.3 This concern finds support in a growing
body of literature on economic statecraft, according to which certain
states use SOEs to achieve geopolitical objectives.4 Foreign
investments by SOEs can be made to secure control over resources,
obtain political concessions, or exercise influence in zones of special
interest.5 To protect national security, host states can block the
1 See DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 9 (1985) (stating that to study
statecraft is to consider the instruments used by policy makers in their attempts to
exercise power).
2 See, e.g., COLIN FLINT, INTRODUCTION TO GEOPOLITICS 38–47 (2d ed. 2012);
JAKUB GRYGIEL, GREAT POWERS AND GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE 39 (2006) (discussing
how some states can increase power by controlling resources).
3 See James Kynge et al., Western Resistance to China Blocks $40bn of Acquisitions,
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), at 1 (stating that since mid-2015, “Western” countries
blocked approximately $40 billion dollars of Chinese acquisitions, mainly in
response to security concerns).
4 See, e.g., TOM MILLER, CHINA’S ASIAN DREAM: EMPIRE BUILDING ALONG THE
NEW SILK ROAD 13 (2017) (examining China’s use of SOEs to expand its geopolitical
influence); ROBERT D. BLACKWILL & JENNIFER M. HARRIS, WAR BY OTHER MEANS:
GEOECONOMIC AND STATECRAFT 1–18, 20 (2016) (observing that some “states are
currently applying economic instruments to advance geopolitical ends”). See also
BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 42–43 (providing examples of economic statecraft);
NICHOLAS J. SPYKMAN, AMERICA’S STRATEGY IN WORLD POLITICS: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE BALANCE OF POWER, 12 (1970) (citing persuasion, purchase, barter, and
coercion as four main methods to win friends and influence people). See generally
WILLIAM J. NORRIS, CHINESE ECONOMIC STATECRAFT: COMMERCIAL ACTORS, GRAND
STRATEGY, AND STATE CONTROL (2016).
5 See, e.g., BLACKWILL & HARRIS, supra note 4, at 53–58 (observing that a large
number of state-led investments are geopolitically motivated, and that even those
which are not can have geopolitical consequences); NORRIS, supra note 4, at 82
(referring to the use of oil reserves as an example in which the state relies on finance
to secure strategic resources); GERRY KEARNS, GEOPOLITICS AND EMPIRE: THE LEGACY
OF HALFORD MACKINDER 268 (2009) (describing how SOEs are used for imperialism);
Aad Correljé & Coby van der Linde, Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics: A
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acquisition of strategic assets by SOEs from states perceived as
unfriendly. They can also re-regulate existing investments in the
case of deterioration of bilateral relations with the home state of the
SOE (e.g., forced disinvestment or renegotiation of the investment
agreement).6 The economic statecraft and geopolitical theories help
host states to understand the security risks of investments by SOEs,
and help SOEs to anticipate the risk of state interference.
The special nature of SOEs and the security risks they pose to
host states are also examined in investment law literature, with a
focus on governance principles, national security reviews, and the
access of SOEs to investment arbitration. It is a principle of
international economic governance that state-owned investment
vehicles should aim to maximize financial returns and operate on
the basis of sound asset management principles.7 In the absence of
liberalization commitments, governments can, at the preestablishment stage, exercise broad discretion and exclude
investments which are perceived to be motivated by unfriendly
intentions.8
At the post-establishment stage, state anxieties
regarding the perceived security risks of SOEs can result in
discriminatory action, which the SOEs can challenge through

European Perspective, 34 ENERGY POLICY 532, 536 (2006) (noting the impact of SOEs
on the security of energy supply to the EU).
6 See, e.g., Rodolphe Desbordes & Vincent Vicard, Foreign Direct Investment and
Bilateral Investment Treaties: An International Political Perspective, 37 J. COMP. ECON.
372, 373 (2009) (“foreign firms may suffer from the retaliatory consequences of
deteriorating diplomatic relations between their home and host countries”);
UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs, ON THE UNCTAD 1, at 30–32
(2009), http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20085_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5JM4FS6] (noting that host countries can impose emergency measures or force
disinvestment if foreign investment poses a threat to national security).
7 See generally INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS,
Sovereign Wealth Fund: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) “Santiago
Principles”
(Oct.
2008),
http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples_0_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K3FQ-4TAG]; OECD, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance
of State-Owned Enterprises 49 (2015 ed.), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264244160en [https://perma.cc/LX9A-XYZY]; Ines Willemyns, Disciplines on State-Owned
Enterprises in International Economic Law: Are We Moving in the Right Direction?, 19 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 657 (2016).
8 See generally Julien Chaisse, Demystifying Public Security Exception and
Limitations on Capital Movement: Hard Law, Soft Law and Sovereign Investments in the
EU Internal Market, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 583 (2015).
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investment arbitration.9 Given the close link between SOEs and
their home state governments, the access of SOEs to arbitration
challenges the core objective of investor-state dispute resolution, to
insulate investors’ claims “from political and diplomatic relations
between states”10 and remove the home state from the arbitration
process.11
Despite their common object of study, the investment law and
economic statecraft literatures have remained largely disconnected
from each other. On the one hand, investment law analyses
recognize that SOEs can pose a challenge to national security,12
without examining the geopolitical roots of this security problem.
On the other hand, geopolitical studies only rarely engage with the
legal dimension of strategic investments13 and pay little attention to
the possible protection of SOEs under investment arbitration. In the
gap between these two disciplines, an essential dimension to the
understanding of investment arbitration is lost.

9 See Paul Blyshak, State-Owned Enterprises and International Investment Treaties:
When Are State-Owned Entities and their Investments Protection, 6 J. INT’L L. & INT’L
REL. 1, 14 (2011) (noting that SOEs may be subject to discriminatory or arbitrary
treatment and emphasizing on the importance to determine the standing of SOEs
to bring investment arbitration claims); UNCTAD, supra note 6, at 30–32 (reminding
that national security considerations can affect investments).
10
Separate Opinion of Andreas Lowenfeld, in Corn Products International,
Inc. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/1, concur in Parts I–VII
of the Awards, ¶ 1 (2008). See also Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, RECUEIL DES COURS
331 (1972) (noting impacts of SOEs on states).
11 See Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, States as Foreign Investors: Diplomatic
Disputes and Legal Fictions, 31 ICSID REV. 12 (2016) (highlighting foreign investments
made by states and their effects on investment treaty arbitrations). See also Martins
Paparinskis, The Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration,
in SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 (James
Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2010) (describing different dimensions of and
limits to the “depoliticization” objective of investment arbitration depending on
whether the perspective of the home state, the host state, or the investor is taken).
12 See, e.g., James E. Mendenhall, Assessing Security Risks Posed by State-Owned
Enterprises in the Context of International Investment Agreements, 31 ICSID REV. 36
(2016) (analyzing the extent to which investments by SOEs present national security
risks to the host state).
13 But see Andreas Goldthau, Assessing Nord Stream 2: Regulation, Geopolitics
and Energy Security in the EU, Central Eastern Europe and the UK, European Centre for
Energy
and
Resource
Security
Strategy
Paper,
19
(2016),
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/eucers
/pubs/strategy-paper-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF4J-5J2Z] (analyzing the
geopolitical, regulatory, and energy security aspects as in the context of Nord
Stream 2).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

388

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 40:2

The main argument of this article is that, in a context of the
growing influence of SOEs and the strategic use of foreign
investments by certain states, geopolitical analysis plays a role in the
resolution of disputes concerning strategic investments. In the
analysis on jurisdiction, the relevance of geopolitical arguments is
limited. Arbitral tribunals can be reluctant to refuse jurisdiction on
the basis of the perceived geopolitical motivation of a SOE, thus
opening the door to the arbitration of geopolitical and state-to-state
disputes. The home state government, through its control of the
SOE, can indirectly be involved in an investor-state dispute
resolution concerning geopolitical issues. However, in an analysis
on the merits, geopolitical arguments are often the only basis
through which a host state can justify regulatory interference with a
strategic investment by a SOE in the context of tensions between its
home state and the host state. The economic statecraft and
geopolitical theories provide a rational framework to assess the
reasonableness of security measures and can thus contribute to
disciplining arbitrary measures under investment arbitration, e.g.,
the politically motivated retaliation against a SOE in the context of
interstate tensions.
The structure of the argument proceeds as follows. Section II
starts with an introduction to the economic statecraft and
geopolitical theories, and, in particular, to the role of foreign
investment by SOEs as instrument of geopolitics. On this basis,
section III (on jurisdiction) examines the question of access of
geopolitical investors to arbitration. Building on the existing
literature on the access of SOEs to arbitration, the analysis focuses
on the extent to which state control and the possible geopolitical
motivation of investments prevent investor-state dispute settlement.
Section IV (on merits) studies the relevance of geopolitical
arguments for the application of substantive standards of
investment protection to the regulation of the perceived security
risks of existing investments (post-establishment). Security reviews
to control the access of foreign investors to strategic industries (preestablishment) are not the focus of this article.
2. A GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The relevance of geopolitical analysis for investment law
depends on a clear delimitation of the notion of “economic
statecraft,” “geopolitical investment,” and “geopolitical risk.” From
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the state’s perspective, it is essential to define these notions to help
the government understand and address the security risks that the
country faces. From the investor’s perspective, a clear delimitation
of the notion of “geopolitical risk” is important to restrict the scope
of government interference with its investments. Indeed, the
concept of geopolitics is a “powerful rhetorical tool” that can
“mobilise materialist or militarist visions of international security.”14
For instance, references to the use of “energy as a foreign political
weapon” and “gas wars” are common in the analysis of foreign
investment and trade in the strategic energy sector.15
2.1. Economic Statecraft and Geopolitical Investments
Economic statecraft refers to the use—or abuse (i.e.,
manipulation)—by states of economic instruments (e.g.,
investments) as an alternative to military power and classical
“Infrastructure
diplomacy to achieve geopolitical results.16
diplomacy” replaces or complements “gunboat diplomacy” as an
instrument of geopolitical influence.17
Although the notion of geopolitics is the subject of controversy,18
the literature generally agrees that, within its broad meaning,

14
STEFANO GUZZINI, THE RETURN OF GEOPOLITICS IN EUROPE? SOCIAL
MECHANISMS AND FOREIGN POLICY IDENTITY CRISES 40–43 (Stefano Guzzini ed., 2013).
15 See Martin Walker, Russia v. Europe: The Energy Wars, 24 WORLD POL’Y J. 1
(2007) (describing Russia’s use of its oil wealth as a geopolitical asset to subdue
former Soviet states).
16 See NORRIS, supra note 4, at 3 (“Economic statecraft can be broadly
understood as state manipulation of international economic activities for strategic
purposes.”); BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 9 (describing statecraft as instruments used
by policy makers to push others to do what they would not otherwise do);
BLACKWILL & HARRIS, supra note 4, at 20 (stating that economic instruments are used
to produce beneficial geopolitical results); Mikael Mattlin & Mikael Wigell, Geoeconomics in the Context of Restive Regional Powers, 14 ASIA EUR. J. 125 (2016)
(analyzing how major regional powers leverage economic power in international
relations).
17
MILLER, supra note 4, at 13.
18 See, e.g., Øyvind Østerud, The Uses and Abuses of Geopolitics, 25 J. PEACE RES.
191 (1988) (describing variations in the use of term geopolitics within the study of
international relations); Christopher Fettweis, Revisiting Mackinder and Angell: The
Obsolescence of Great Power Geopolitics, 22 COMP. STRATEGY 109 (2003) (arguing that
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geopolitics concerns the interaction between geographical attributes
(spatial location, size, topography, borders, climate, and distribution
of resources) and international political power.19 The “geopolitical
reality” is defined by “the geographic distribution of centers of
resources and lines of communication, assigning value to locations
according to their strategic importance.”20 Geopolitical analysis
helps us to understand the practice of states competing for territory
and resources, and defending their national security.21 The strategic
importance of certain resources and locations for national security
drives states to develop foreign policies to achieve control over these
resources and protect their strategic interests in these locations.
Geopolitics, within the progressive meaning of the term, covers
the use of soft power instruments, including foreign investments by
SOEs in sectors of strategic importance.
SOEs can act as
“geopolitical investors” by making investments that pursue
strategic interests.22
In the energy sector, for instance, foreign investments by SOEs
can aim to achieve the strategic objectives of energy security and
increased influence in zones of special strategic interest.23 First, by
investing in energy-producing states and developing cross-border
pipeline infrastructures, SOEs from energy-importing states (e.g.,
China’s CNPC) contribute to the availability of external energy
while the term geopolitics classically referred to territorial conquests, the term has
evolved in modern times and is now broader in scope).
19 See SAUL BERNARD COHEN, GEOPOLITICS: THE GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 16 (3d ed. 2015) (recognizing the importance of geography’s role in
modern geopolitics and international affairs); GEOFFREY PARKER, GEOPOLITICS: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 5 (1998) (defining geopolitics as the study of international
relations from a spatial or geographic perspective).
20
GRYGIEL, supra note 2, at 22.
21 SEE FLINT, supra note 2, at 31 (providing sources that reflect the scope of the
geopolitical framework); GRYGIEL, supra note 2, at 39 (arguing that states have
various motivations to control borders and economic resources).
22 See, e.g., BLACKWILL & HARRIS, supra note 4, 53–58 (noting an impact on
international relations when SOEs invest in foreign countries); KEARNS supra note
5, at 268 (discussing transnational corporations and their effects on the labor laws
of the foreign countries where they invest); Correljé & van der Linde, supra note 5,
at 536 (arguing that regional powers create spheres of influence through bilateral
trade relationships in energy).
23 See ANDREAS GOLDTHAU & NICK SITTER, A LIBERAL ACTOR IN A REALIST WORLD
4 (2015) (discussing the changing dynamics of post-Cold War energy policies and
their effect on international affairs).
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sources for the home state.24 The mandate by the state to secure
external energy supplies explains decisions to invest in high-risk
markets where commercially-driven companies can be reluctant to
operate (e.g., Central Asia).25 Second, SOEs from energy-exporting
countries (e.g., Russia’s Gazprom) engage in the development of
infrastructure in order to secure the future demand for their energy
products, and thereby to protect the financial viability of their
investments in new oil and gas fields.26 These projects (e.g., the
Nord Stream pipeline linking Russia to the EU by bypassing
Ukraine) are often criticized for locking the importing countries into
a relationship of energy dependence.27 Third, states can use foreign
energy investments to exercise broader geopolitical influence.
Similarly to the subsidization of energy supply in exchange for
geostrategic allegiance,28 analysts explain Russian investments in
the downstream energy infrastructure of post-Soviet countries (e.g.,
24 See, e.g., THRASSY MARKETOS, CHINA’S ENERGY GEOPOLITICS: THE SHANGHAI
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AND CENTRAL ASIA 20 (2009) (describing China’s
decision to invest in the port of Gwadar in Pakistan in order to secure an alternative
route to transport oil); Xiaolei Sun, et al., China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments
in Overseas Energy: The Energy Security Perspective, 65 ENERGY POL. 1, 654–61 (2014)
(describing China’s use of its sovereign wealth fund to invest in foreign energy
projects); Bo Kong & Kevin Gallagher, The Globalization of Chinese Energy Companies:
The Role of State Finance, ON BOSTON ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE 11–13 (2016),
http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2016/06/Globalization.Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FW2Q-CZAT] (outlining Chinese government control over
Chinese energy companies).
25 See, e.g., HINRICH VOSS, THE DETERMINANTS OF CHINESE OUTWARD DIRECT
INVESTMENT 133 (2011) (hypothesizing that Chinese government policies account
for a positive correlation between countries with higher risk and Chinese foreign
investment in those countries).
26 See Tatiana Mitrova, The Geopolitics of Russian Natural Gas, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY BELFER CENTER & BAKER INSTITUTE CENTER FOR ENERGY STUDIES, at 15
(2014),
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/research_document/cdfea656/CESpub-GeoGasRussiax-022114.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5EUS-9GEX]
(describing
Russia’s use of its gas resources to exercise influence over former Soviet states).
27 See, e.g., Jekterina Grigorjeva & Marco Siddi, Nord Stream 2: Opportunities
and Dilemmas of a New Gas Supply Route for the EU, JACQUES DELORS INSTITUTE (2016),
http://www.delorsinstitut.de/2015/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/20160510_Nord-Stream-2_Grigorjeva_SiddiONLIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF5N-N7KX] (arguing that the Nord Stream 2
pipeline makes Europe more dependent on Russian gas).
28 See Stacy Closson, A Comparative Analysis on Energy Subsidies in Soviet and
Russian Policy, 44 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 343 (2011) (describing
Russia’s use of hydrocarbon subsidies to influence former Soviet states).
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power plants in Central Asia) are based on Russia’s geopolitical
interest in retaining these countries within its sphere of influence.29
Furthermore, analysts explain Chinese investments in the
downstream energy infrastructure of its neighbors based on China’s
strategic interest to maintain political stability in its “strategic
rear.”30 China’s participation in facilitating the energy security of its
strategic partners is an important part of
China’s “good
neighborhood” policy and, more recently, its “Belt and Road” (New
Silk Road) initiative.31
Although analysts generally agree that geopolitical objectives
(energy security and strategic influence) are an important rationale
of foreign investments by Russian SOEs, analysts disagree on
whether geopolitics constitute the only or dominant driver of these
investments. Some consider Gazprom’s investments in the EU
energy market as being driven by “fairly conventional profit

29 See, e.g., ALEXANDER COOLEY, GREAT GAMES, LOCAL RULES: THE NEW GREAT
POWER CONTEST ON CENTRAL ASIA 67, 116–33 (2012); Natal’ia Skorolygina,
Rosneftegaz zaplatit za Kirgiziiu, KOMMERSANT (Mar. 14, 2014),
www.kommersant.ru/doc/2428684 [https://perma.cc/M4KG-BNK2] (detailing
Russian government financing of a major Kyrgyz power plant); International Crisis
Group,
Kyrgyzstan:
A
Hollow
Regime
Collapses
5–6,
https://www.ciaonet.org/catalog/18752
[https://perma.cc/E5AA-D4FS]
(arguing that Russian government’s financial aid given to Kyrgyzstan for its energy
crisis in 2009 was conditioned on Kyrgyz closure of U.S. airbase); LENA JONSON,
TAJIKISTAN IN THE NEW CENTRAL ASIA: GEOPOLITICS GREAT POWER RIVALRY AND
RADICAL ISLAM 77–78 (2006) (describing the competition between Russia and Iran to
invest in Tajikistan’s energy infrastructure).
30
On China’s “strategic rear,” see, e.g., Zhao Huasheng, Central Asia in Chinese
Strategic Thinking, in THE NEW GREAT GAME: CHINA AND SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
IN THE ERA OF REFORM 171, 177–85 (Thomas Fingar ed., 2016) (describing Chinese
government efforts to secure gas supplies from Central Asia, which is described as
territory within Russia’s zone of influence); Thomas Fingar, China and South and
Central Asia in the Era of Reform and Opening, in THE NEW GREAT GAME: CHINA AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA IN THE ERA OF REFORM 13 (Thomas Fingar ed., 2016)
(arguing that when deciding to engage with other countries, the Chinese
government rely on the effect that the engagement would have on its security and
internal stability). See generally MARLÈNE LARUELLE & SEBASTIEN PEYROUSE, THE
CHINESE QUESTION ON CENTRAL ASIA: DOMESTIC ORDER, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND THE
CHINESE FACTOR (2012).
31
CHIEN-PEN CHUNG, CHINA’S MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC: INSTITUTIONALISING BEIJING’S “GOOD NEIGHBOUR POLICY” (2010) (describing
China’s policy of creating good network relations with its neighboring countries);
MILLER, supra note 4, at 21–43 (examining China’s use of SOEs for its “Belt and
Road” initiative).
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motives, albeit under conditions of geopolitical uncertainty.”32
Others argue that Russian SOEs “serve the purposes of Russia’s
foreign policy rather than commercial logic.”33 The Nord Stream 2
project, for instance, is “not a commercial project only; it has huge
political implications.”34 Similarly, the rationale for outbound
investments by Chinese SOEs is often defined based on a mix of
geopolitical and commercial interests.35 According to Fitch Rating’s
2017 report on China’s “Belt and Road” (OBOR) initiative, “genuine
infrastructure needs and commercial logic might be secondary to
political motivations. OBOR . . . is a component of China’s efforts to
32
Rawi Abdelal, The Profits of Power: Commerce and Realpolitik in Eurasia, 20
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 421, 438 (2013); see also Sanja Tepavcevic, The Motives of
Russian State-Owned Companies for Outward Foreign Direct Investment and its Impact
on State-Company Cooperation, 23 TRANSNAT’L CORP. 29, 53 (2015),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/diaeia2015d1a2_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P8LT-U8TF] (arguing that profits and business interests are the
primary motivation of Russian SOE investments in foreign countries).
33
Peeter Vahtra, Expansion or Exodus? Russian TNCs Amidst the Global Economic
Crisis,
PAN-EUROPEAN
INSTITUTE
7
(2009),
https://www.utu.fi/fi/yksikot/tse/yksikot/PEI/raportit-jatietopaketit/Documents/Vahtra_Russian%20TNCs%20global%20economic%20cri
si_2009%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7U6-KLAB]; see also Kari Liuhto, Genesis of
Economic
Nationalism
in
Russia,
PAN-EUROPEAN
INSTITUTE
(2008),
https://www.utu.fi/fi/yksikot/tse/yksikot/PEI/raportit-jatietopaketit/Documents/Liuhto_32008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q53J-M4MH]
(arguing that Russian government control over companies that extract natural
resources is part of a broader nationalist economic strategy); Nina Poussenkova,
The Global Expansion of Russia’s Energy Giants, 63 COLUM. J. INT’L AFF. 103 (2010)
(describing close ties between various Russian state-owned energy companies and
the Russian government).
34
Ewa Krukowska, Russian Gas Link Extension May Face EU Law Compliance
Risk, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201602-04/russian-nord-stream-2-gas-link-may-face-eu-law-compliance-risk
[https://perma.cc/H4HT-JMQS].
35 See Mathieu Duchâtel, et al., Protecting China’s Overseas Interests: The Slow
Shift Away from Non-Interference, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RESEARCH INSTIT. POL’Y
PAPER
41,
34
(June
2014),
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIPP41.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JS85-AD7P] (examining how China will use political influence
and military power internationally in support of its national interests); see also Julie
Jiang & Jonathan Sinton, Overseas Investments by Chinese National Oil Companies:
Assessing the Drivers and Impacts, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 12, 17 (2011),
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/overseas_china
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKL2-HRXL] (arguing that commercial motives and
securing supply to meet domestic energy demands drives state-owned investments
abroad).
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expand its strategic international influence.”36
Geopolitical
investments in the energy sector are thus often “hybrid”37 or
“chameleon”38 investments.
2.2. Geopolitical Risk, Security Externalities, and Regulatory Changes
With the exception of climate change and boundary adjustments
following drastic political changes, geographical attributes are
mostly constant. However, geopolitics are dynamic.39 Geopolitical
reality changes with the rise and decline of resources, routes, and
locations. Technological, economic, and political developments
alter the strategic importance of locations, and this can trigger the
re-orientation of a state’s foreign policies towards these locations.
To an important extent, the re-orientation of a state’s external
strategy depends on the frame of reference (or “geopolitical code”)
that governs the government’s interpretation of geopolitical
developments.40 Changes to geopolitical reality are relatively slow
and irrevocable, but decisions of strategic re-orientation based on
the national authorities’ interpretation of geopolitical reality can be
sudden. The dynamic nature of geopolitics constitutes both a
security risk for host states and a regulatory risk for investors.
From the host state’s perspective, the deterioration or reorientation of the bilateral relationship with the home state of the
SOE can create new security risks in cases where strategic assets are

36
FitchRatings, China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative Brings Risks (Jan. 25, 2017),
www.fitchratings.com/site/pr/1018144 [https://perma.cc/FC5D-JQJ3].
37
Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of State, Speech at the Economic Club of New York:
Economic
Statecraft
(Oct.
14,
2011),
https://20092017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175552.htm
[https://perma.cc/E88V-VNGE].
38
Larry Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: The
Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance Through Private Global
Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 425 (2010).
39 See Nicholas Spykman, Geography and Foreign Policy, I, 32 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
28, 43 (1938) (describing how every country’s perception of international relations
changes with its geographical location).
40 Id. See also FLINT, supra note 2, at 43 (listing changes in economic strength
and military costs as a challenge to world leadership).
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concerned.41 Following shifts in strategic alliances, the host state can
perceive42 investments by the SOE from a previously allied state as
a new “security externality” that requires regulatory intervention.43
For foreign investors in strategic assets, the host state’s
perception of changes to the geopolitical context and the perceived
necessity to mitigate the security risks resulting from the
deterioration of interstate relations are significant regulatory risks.
In more extreme cases, the host state can be tempted to retaliate
against foreign investments by SOEs to punish the home state in the
context of interstate tensions. The EU-Russian energy relationship
illustrates how foreign investments in strategic assets can be affected
by (allegedly politically motivated) regulatory intervention taken in
the context of deteriorating bilateral relations between the home and
host states.
For decades, the EU’s dependence on Russian energy was not
considered a direct threat to EU energy security.44 The EU’s energy
policy has long sought to achieve the “mutual long term benefits” of
EU-Russian energy interdependence by intensifying commercial
and political cooperation.45 Import dependence was not to be
41 See UNCTAD, supra note 6, at 17 (arguing that national security concerns
can be particularly strong in relation to foreign investors from states with which the
host state has unfriendly relations); Desbordes & Vicard, supra note 6, at 373
(arguing that multinational enterprises may face certain risks arising due to
political relations between the home and host state).
42 See STEPHEN WALT, THE ORIGINS OF ALLIANCES (1987) (arguing that a state’s
perception of threat is more important than pure power in determining threats and
alliance behavior); see also ANDREW KYDD, TRUST AND MISTRUST IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (2005) (noting variables affecting states’ trust, including SOEs); Srikanth
Kondapalli, Perception and Strategic Reality in India-China Relations, in HUASHENG,
supra note 30, at 93, 96 (describing relations between India and China as “marked
by suspicion, ambivalence, and hedging”).
43 See, e.g., NORRIS, supra note 4, at 12–13 (using economic theory of
externalities to describe the relationship between economics and national security);
Abdelal, supra note 32, at 426 (noting that the interests of energy oligopolies can
conflict with the security concerns of the state).
44
For a historical account, see, e.g., ANDREI V. BELYI, TRANSNATIONAL GAS
MARKETS AND EURO-RUSSIAN ENERGY RELATIONS (Timothy M. Shaw ed., 2015)
(examining EU-Russia energy interdependence and its impact on Euro-Russian
relations over time); PER HÖGSELIUS, RED GAS: RUSSIA AND THE ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN
ENERGY DEPENDENCE (Akira Iriye & Rana Mitter eds., 2013) (analyzing the evolution
of the Soviet natural gas infrastructure and its interconnection with European
energy markets).
45 See Communication from the Commission to the European Council: External
Energy Relations - From Principles to Action, COM (2006) 590 final (Oct. 12, 2006),
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reduced, but managed.46 Russian energy companies invested in the
EU energy market and EU companies invested in Russia. However,
successive Russia-Ukraine crises negatively affected the EU’s
perception of Russian energy and seriously damaged the EURussian energy relationship.47 According to the 2014 European
Energy Security Strategy, “the most pressing energy security of
supply issue is the strong dependence from a single external
supplier,” which, in the EU’s case, is Russia.48
The deterioration of the EU-Russian energy relationship and the
perception of risk regarding the EU’s external energy dependence
triggered the EU’s adoption of regulatory measures directed at
addressing this concern. Most notably, in 2009, the EU introduced
an energy security review mechanism—the “Gazprom clause”—to
evaluate the risk that non-EU investors pose to the security of the
EU energy sector.49 A key element in this energy security
assessment is the level of energy dependence between the EU and
the home country of the applicant50—a criterion that de facto targets
Russian energy investors by taking into account EU dependence on
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2006/EN/1-2006-590-EN-F11.Pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZHG-VRCM] (discussing engagement with EU
neighbors to achieve greater energy cooperation across the region).
46 See, e.g., Commission Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy for the Security
of Energy Supply, at 15, COM (2000) 769 final (2000) (assessing the EU’s long-term
strategic interests and the methods by which to achieve these goals).
47 See
Council of the European Union Press Release, Transport,
Telecommunications and Energy Council Meeting, Council Conclusions on “Energy
Prices and Costs, Protection of Vulnerable Consumers and Competitiveness,” COUNCIL
MEETING
(June
13,
2014),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/trans/
143198.pdf [https://perma.cc/69PW-UZ76] (reviewing the EUs internal and
external energy markets and the impact of those markets on consumers).
48 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council:
European Energy Security Strategy, at 1, COM (2014) 330 final (May 28, 2014),
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/publication/European_Energy_Se
curity_Strategy_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9QH-PH8V].
49 See Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 July 2009 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas and
Repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, art 11, 2009 O.J. (L211) 94, 95 (requiring Member
States to implement security reviews of foreign investments in the electricity and
natural gas transmission infrastructure).
50 Id. at recital 22 (examining EU energy dependence on States outside the EU
and highlighting the importance of securing the supply of energy within EU
Member States).
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Russian imports.51 In addition to the Gazprom clause, EU member
states have implemented measures for ownership unbundling of
energy activities (i.e., separation of control over network and supply
assets). These measures directly interfered with the business model
of Gazprom in the EU. In reaction, Gazprom, a Russian company,
initiated investment arbitration proceedings to contest the
implementation of these measures in Lithuania.52 Russia also
regularly accuses the EU Commission of engaging in “politically
motivated interpretations of EU regulation”53 aimed at
“expropriat[ing] Gazprom’s assets” in the EU.54
Similarly, policy analysts note a risk to Chinese energy
investments stemming from political and regulatory intervention by
host States who perceive China’s increasing influence in the host
State as a threat.55 Recent riots in Kazakhstan against Chinese
investments highlight China’s susceptibility to the risk of “resource
nationalism,” namely, the risk of Kazakhstan nationalizing Chinese
investments to address public anger about a perceived “takeover”

51 See Thomas Cottier, et al., Third Country Relations in EU Unbundling of
Natural Gas Markets: The “Gazprom Clause” of Directive 2009/73 EC and WTO Law
(WORLD TRADE INSTITUTE, NCCR TRADE REGULATION, UNIVERSITY OF BERN,
SWITZERLAND,
WORKING
PAPER
NO.
2010/06,
http://www.nccrtrade.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nccrtrade.ch/wp5/Access%20to%20gasgrids.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2C2-EDJ8]
(assessing the Gazprom clause under WTO law).
52 See Permanent Court of Arbitration, OAO Gazprom (Russian Federation) v.
The Republic of Lithuania, (2013) (case interrupted), in PERMANENT COURT OF
ARBITRATION ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2014), https://perma.cc/A3Z8-2S47 (reporting
Gazprom’s claim arising out of the alleged forced divestiture of its investment in
gas distribution in Lithuania).
53
Goldthau, supra note 13, at 22.
54
Goldthau, supra note 13, at 19. See also Marek Martyniszyn, The EU’s Case
Against Gazprom Is About Far More than Business, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 24, 2015),
http://theconversation.com/the-eus-case-against-gazprom-is-about-far-morethan-business-40773 [https://perma.cc/KDM3-7HJP] (analyzing EU-Russia
relations through a Gazprom lens); Jonathan Stern et al., Does the Cancellation of
South Stream Signal a Fundamental Reorientation of Russian Gas Export Policy?, THE
OXFORD
INSTITUTE
FOR
ENERGY
STUDIES
(Jan.
2015),
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Doescancellation-of-South-Stream-signal-a-fundamental-reorientation-of-Russian-gasexport-policy-GPC-5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2GT-XQ5L]
(discussing
the
Gazprom-EU discourse regarding the South Stream infrastructure project).
55 See Duchâtel, et al., supra note 35, at 25–26 (examining China’s foreign policy
shift from non-interference to pragmatic intervention).
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of national resources by China.56 As highlighted by the China
Heilongjiang International v. Mongolia arbitration case, public
opposition to increasing dependence on China can result in the
sudden cancellation of licenses previously granted to Chinese
companies for the exploration and exploitation of national
resources.57
In this strategic context, can state-owned investors in projects of
geopolitical importance challenge state interference with their
investments through international arbitration mechanisms?
3. JURISDICTION: ACCESS OF GEOPOLITICAL INVESTORS TO INVESTORSTATE ARBITRATION
The protection of state-owned investors is central in the debate
on the commercial nature and limits of investment arbitration.58 The
56 See, e.g., Sebastien Peyrouse, Central Asia’s Tortured Chinese Love Affair, EAST
ASIA FORUM (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/11/30/centralasias-tortured-chinese-loveaffair/?utm_source=subscribe2&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=postnotify
&utm_id=53297&utm_title=Central+Asia%26rsquo%3Bs+tortured+Chinese+love
+affair [https://perma.cc/22KD-6UQS] (highlighting the effects of China’s
increasing influence in central Asia).
57
Beijing Shougang Mining Inv. Co. Ltd. v. Mongolia (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2017).
See also Sergey Radchenko, Sino-Russian Competition in Mongolia, THE ASAN FORUM
(Nov. 22, 2013), http://mad-intelligence.com/sino-russian-competition-inmongolia/ [https://perma.cc/V6GD-HNSR] (discussing the foreign investment
competition between Russia and China in Mongolia); Leon Trakman, Geopolitics,
China, and Investor-state Arbitration, in CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER: NEW DIRECTIONS AND CHANGING PARADIGMS 268, 284 (Lisa Toohey et al. eds.,
2015) (examining China’s use of BITs to improve its economy and broaden its
influence abroad).
58 See, e.g., Meg Lippincott, Depoliticizing Sovereign Wealth Funds Through
International Arbitration, 13 CHI. J. INT. L. 649 (2013) (assessing the impact of
international arbitration on the ability to monitor sovereign wealth funds); Claudia
Annacker, Protection and Admission of Sovereign Investment under Investment Treaties,
10 CHINESE J. INT. L. 531 (2011) (examining the role of the sovereign investor in
investor-State arbitration); Skovgaard Poulsen, supra note 11 (highlighting
increasing globalization of State capitalism and the potential need for reevaluating
investment treaty provisions); Blyshak, supra note 9 (analyzing the status of Stateowned enterprise in the realm of foreign investment); Mark Feldman, The Standing
of State-Owned Entities under Investment Treaties, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2010–2011 (Karl Sauvant ed., 2011) (discussing the
role of state-owned entities under international investment treaties).
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participation of SOEs in investment arbitration presents a challenge
to the investment law discipline relating to the role of the state as
claimant in investor-state disputes. The question of access of
“geopolitical investors” to arbitration is closely related to this
debate. In addition to the issue of state ownership, the protection of
geopolitical investors involves strategic (i.e., not purely commercial)
considerations. Do state ownership and the pursuit of noncommercial objectives bar access to arbitration? Alternatively, does
investment arbitration—a mechanism created to remove the home
state from investor-state dispute resolution—provide a forum for
the settlement of disputes with geopolitical characteristics?
Access to arbitration first depends on the claimant’s
qualification as an “investor” within the meaning of the applicable
investment treaty. Investment treaties that expressly refer to SOEs
in the definition of “investors” are the exception.59 However, state
ownership and control are unlikely to be obstacles to accessing
arbitration under investment treaties that leave open the form of
ownership of the investors covered by the treaty (e.g., most Russian
and Chinese bilateral investment treaties (BITs)).60
According to the 2016 judgment of the Paris Court of Appeals in
Ukraine v. Tatneft, treaties that do not explicitly include the
requirement of private ownership in the definition of investors

59 See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Can.-Mex.-U.S., arts.
201, 1139, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (listing country-specific definitions and
dispute-related definitions); Kazakhstan Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Kaz.,
May 19, 1992, U.S. DEPT. ST. (outlining agreed-upon BIT objectives between the
United States and Kazakhstan); Kyrgyzstan Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Kyrg.,
Jan. 19, 1993, U.S. DEPT. ST. (outlining agreed-upon BIT objectives between the
United States and Kyrgyzstan). See also other US BITs discussed in KENNETH
VANDEVELDE, U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 122 (2009) (highlighting
a 2004 modification to the United States’ model for its bilateral investment treaties).
60 See
DMITRII LABIN, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO PO ZASHCHITE I
POOSHCHRENIIU INOSTRANNYKH INVESTITSII (2008); VADIM SILKIN, PRIAMYE
INOSTRANNYE INVESTITSII V ROSSII – PRAVOVYE FORMY PRIVLECHENIIA I ZASHCHITY
(2003); NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES:
POLICIES AND PRACTICE (Loukas Mistelis ed., 2009) (analyzing the policies and
practices around Chinese investment treaties). Cf. Agreement Between the
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic
of Uzbekistan on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Uzb., Apr.
19, 2011, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, DEPT. OF
TREATY & LAW (outlining agreed-upon BIT objectives between the China and
Uzbekistan).
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cannot be limited in scope to “private investors.”61 According to the
2017 China Heilongjiang v. Mongolia arbitral award, “the fact that the
Chinese State directly or indirectly owns . . . China Heilongjiang has
no relevance for the purpose of [China Heilongjiang’s] qualification
as [an] ‘economic entit[y],’” and thus qualifies as an “investor”
within the meaning of the China-Mongolia investment treaty.62 If
the absence of an explicit reference to state ownership and control is
interpreted to exclude SOEs from the scope of investment treaties, a
very significant share of China’s and Russia’s foreign investments
would be denied the benefit of arbitration.63
Second, access to arbitration of geopolitical projects depends on
their legal qualification as “investments,” and in particular whether
the applicable treaty is limited in scope to purely commercial
investment activities. Most investment treaties adopt a broad
definition of investment as “every kind of asset, owned or controlled
by an Investor.”64 Certain investment treaties expressly refer to
“economic activities” or “business enterprises” in the definition of
investment.65 Arbitral tribunals have taken diverging approaches to

61 See Cour d’Appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, civ., Nov. 29, 2016,
14/17964, ¶ 514 (Fr.) (confirming that the entity requesting the arbitration benefited
from the protection of the bilateral investment treaty as it had to be considered to
be a foreign investor and not be assimilated with the contracting state); id. at ¶ 525
(holding that for the Court, neither the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
nor any principle of interpretation allows a distinction where the bilateral
investment treaty does not distinguish. Yet, the latter does not refer to any
“private” investor.). See also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States Preamble (Oct. 14, 1966),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6KSJ-FMPV] (referring to the “role of private international
investment” for international economic cooperation, without limiting the scope of
the Convention to private investors) (emphasis added).
62
Beijing Shougang Mining Inv. Co. Ltd., et al. v. Mongolia, supra note 57, at
¶ 417.
63 See Annacker, supra note 58, at 539–40 (discussing investment treaties that
fail to expressly protect SOEs investing abroad).
64
JESWALD SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 195 (Sir Frank Berman
KCMG QC ed., 2d ed. 2015).
65 See, e.g., Energy Charter Treaty art. 1, ¶ 6, Dec. 17, 1994, 1994 O.J. (L 380) 24;
Agreement Between the Czech Republic and the United Mexican States on the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Czech-Mex., art. 1, Mar. 13,
2004; Agreement Between the Lebanese Republic and the Republic of Iceland on
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Leb-Ice., art. 1, June 24,
2004; Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Federal Republic
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the interpretation of “investment” when investment activities are
linked to the home state’s foreign policy.
On the one hand, some arbitral tribunals have been reluctant to
engage in an assessment of the motivation underlying foreign
investments. According to the 2006 arbitral decision in Saluka v.
Czech Republic, “[e]ven if it were possible to know an investor’s true
motivation in making its investment, nothing . . . makes the
investor’s motivation part of the definition of an ‘investment.’”66 In
the 2003 CSOB v. Slovakia award, the tribunal ruled that “in
determining whether [the state-owned entity], in discharging these
functions, exercised governmental functions, the focus must be on
the nature of these activities and not their purpose.”67 The claimant
in this case was found to act on behalf of the state and to promote
governmental policies and purposes. Nevertheless, the tribunal
found that the activities themselves (i.e., banking) were essentially
economic rather than governmental in nature, and, on this basis, the
tribunal accepted jurisdiction.68
On the other hand, in China Heilongjiang v. Mongolia, the arbitral
tribunal readily examined whether the claimants acted as “quasiinstrumentalities of the Chinese government.”69 In particular, the
of Germany on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-Ger., art. 1, Nov. 11, 2005.
66
Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, 18 World Trade & Arbitration
Materials 169 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006); see also Annacker, supra note 58, at 543–44
(arguing, in the same vein, that investment treaties do not “exclude investments
because the assets invested are . . . invested in furtherance of State policies or
purposes”).
67
Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovakia, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4,
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 20 (May 24, 1999). See also CDC Group
PLC v. Republic of the Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, Award, ¶ 17 (Dec.
17, 2003) (acknowledging that the “CDC’s activities are commercial in substance
and nature.”). It must be noted that both decisions were made on the basis of the
ICSID Convention that, according to the so-called “Broches test” does not extend
arbitration to foreign investors that are “acting as an agent for the government or
[are] discharging an essentially governmental function.” Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
supra note 61.
68
For criticism of these decisions, see FELDMAN, supra note 57, at 24 (critiquing
the decisions in the cases involving CSOB and CDC Group, respectively); BLYSHAK,
supra note 9, at 30–32 (arguing against unconditional acceptance of the “nature” test
applied in CSOB).
69
Beijing Shougang Mining Inv. Co. Ltd., et al. v. Mongolia, supra note 57, at
¶ 418.
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tribunal assessed whether the Chinese state-owned enterprises
acted under the Chinese government’s “express instruction to invest
abroad in order to serve China’s foreign policy goals,” and
concluded that they did not.70 Similarly, in the 2017 Beijing Urban
Construction Group v. Yemen award, the tribunal assessed whether
the Chinese state-owned enterprise functioned as an agent of the
state.71 In that case, the tribunal focused on the functions of the
enterprise “in the particular instance” of its investment activity, and
again ruled that the SOE did not make the investment concerned as
a state agent.72
By focusing on the commercial nature (as opposed to the
purpose) of investments, the former interpretative approach
(endorsed by the Saluka and CSOB tribunals) opens arbitration to
investors that pursue foreign policy objectives. Geopolitical
investments—as part of a State’s infrastructure diplomacy—are
generally economic in nature. In the energy sector, for instance, they
are made in connection with the economic activities of energy
production, transportation, or supply. Moreover, these investments
are generally long-term, involve operational risks, and contribute to
the economic development of the host state.73 The same conclusion
applies to strategic investments that have limited prospects of future
profitability (e.g., Russian investments in power plants in Central
Asia). Some investment treaties include the “expectation of gain or
profit” in the definition of investment.74 Even in this case,
international investment law does not condition access to arbitration
As
to a market-economy test or a rational-investor test.75
Id.
Beijing Urban Construction Group v. Yemen, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/14/30, ¶ 42 (May 31, 2017).
72 Id.
73
Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v. Kingdom of Morocco,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001) (discussing
“the criteria to be used for the definition of an investment pursuant to the
convention.”).
74 See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental
Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Uru., art.1, Nov. 1, 2006. See generally, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral
Investment
Treaty,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.p
df.
75
In contrast, at the pre-establishment stage, governments (e.g., in the USA
and Australia) look at the motivation of the prospective investors. The Australian
70
71
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highlighted by the Allard v. Barbados case, tribunals can accept that
“expectations of an eventual profit were honestly held by [the
investor] . . . notwithstanding that . . . factors of profit were
considered secondary and in the background to his principal
motivations of . . . public purposes.”76
However, following the latter purpose-based interpretative
approach (endorsed by the China Heilongjiang and Beijing Urban
Construction Group tribunals), an arbitral tribunal can in principle
refuse jurisdiction if there is evidence that the foreign investment
was made in the pursuit of the home state’s strategic interest, based
on express instructions by the home state government. According
to geopolitical theory and as highlighted by Russia’s energy
investments in Central Asia, geopolitical investments can be made
on the basis of express government orders to realize these projects
as part of the country’s foreign policy (infrastructure diplomacy).77
However, finding conclusive evidence of the strategic rationale of
an investment is a most delicate task.78 As examined above, the

Government considers “if the investment is commercial in nature or if the investor
may be pursuing broader political or strategic objectives that may be contrary to
Australia’s national interest.” Treasury of the Commonwealth of Australia,
Australia’s
Foreign
Investment
Policy
10
(2016),
https://firb.gov.au/files/2015/09/Australias-Foreign-Investment-Policy-20162017.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAV5-GND5].
The Committee on Foreign
Investment in the USA examines whether investments have been “based solely on
commercial grounds”, taking into account the degree of disclosure by the investor
of the objectives of its investments. Guidance Concerning the National Security
Review Conducted by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States,
73 Fed. Reg 74,567, 74,571 (Dec. 8, 2008), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/foreign-investment/Documents/CFIUSGuidance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WER5-6T5A].
76
Allard v. Barbados, Decision on Jurisdiction, PCA Case Repository No.
2012-06, ¶ 51 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014).
77 See, e.g., Pastanavlenie Pravitel’stva RF July 30, 2009 No. 1063-r ‘O podpisanii
Soglasheniia mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Pravitel’stvom Respubliki
Tadzhikistan o Sotrudnichestve po Ekspluatatsii Sangtudinskoi GES-1’, SOBRANIE
ZAKONODATEL’STVA RF 4055 (Aug. 10, 2009); Pastanavlenie Pravitel’stva RF Apr.6
2013 No. 299 ‘O vnesenii na ratifikatsiiu Soglasheniia mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Rossiiskoi
Federatsii i Pravitel’stvom Kirgizskoi Respubliki o Stroitel’stve i Ekspluatatsii
Kambaratinskoi GES-1, SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA RF 1805 (Apr. 15, 2013).
78
For instance, concomitance between the making of a certain foreign
investment and certain geopolitical developments could serve as evidence of the
geopolitical purpose of a foreign investment. See, e.g., Caratube International Oil
Company LLP v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13, Award, ¶ 936 (Sept.
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objectives of geopolitical investments are often masked and mixed
With “hybrid companies
with commercial considerations.79
masquerading as commercial actors, but actually controlled by
states and acting with strategic consequences,”80 the geopolitical
purpose of investments is difficult to determine based on objective
factors.
In conclusion, a host state government’s perception that a certain
investment poses a risk to national security is difficult to integrate
into the tribunal’s analysis on jurisdiction. Rejecting the purposebased approach to the assessment of investments is both logical and
practical. By focusing on the economic nature of investments,
arbitration tribunals avoid the delicate task of discovering the real
motivation underlying foreign investments in strategic sectors.81 On
this basis, investment arbitration can provide the forum for the
resolution of disputes that indirectly involve the home state as
claimant and that concern heavily politicized issues of potential high
strategic importance for both states involved.82 However, as will be
seen in the following section, geopolitical arguments relating to
governments’ perceptions of risk are relevant for the application of
substantive standards of protection.
4. MERITS: STATES’ RIGHT TO REGULATE GEOPOLITICAL RISK
The debate in the investment law literature on the sovereign
right to regulate has, to a large extent, centered on the internalization
of environmental externalities.83 A closely related question is
27, 2017) (ruling that “the chronology of the facts taken as a whole” can provide
evidence of the “real motivation” behind parties’ actions).
79 See Section II.A, infra.
80
Clinton, supra note 37.
81
Blyshak, supra note 9, at 29; Ji Li, State-Owned Enterprises in the Current
Regime of Investor-State Arbitration, in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION 380, 401 (Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco eds., 2015).
82
For criticism, see Blyshak, supra note 9, at 39 (discussing potential
complications with investment arbitration involving a “government agent”);
Feldman, supra note 58 (discussing issues of standing for SOEs under the ICSID).
83 See, e.g., KYLA TIENHAARA, THE EXPROPRIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTORS AT THE EXPENSE OF PUBLIC POLICY
(2009) (discussing the relationship between investment protection and
environmental protection); JORGE VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE
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whether, in the context of increasing concerns regarding the role of
SOEs as geopolitical actors, investment arbitration recognizes the
host states’ right to internalize the security externalities of existing
investments in strategic assets (e.g., new operational restrictions,
mandatory partnership with a national investor, and even forced
disinvestment). Can the host states’ perception of geopolitical risk
justify security measures under investment arbitration—a
mechanism that aims to depoliticize investor-state disputes on the
basis of “objective enquiry”84 and “objective legal criteria”?85
4.1. Non-discrimination of Non-allied Foreign SOEs and Due Process
The admission of foreign investments in strategic sectors
following a national security review does not on its own constitute
a commitment by the state to refrain from adopting more stringent
security requirements in the future.86 In some cases, national law
can even explicitly foresee the possibility to reopen security reviews
ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015) (analyzing the major challenges facing
States and foreign investors as a result of the friction between investment law and
environmental law); see generally AIKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2014) (discussing States’ and regional
organisations’ right to regulate under specific public policy objectives to safeguard
their regulatory power and delimit tribunals’ interpretive power); CAROLINE
HENCKELS, PROPORTIONALITY AND DEFERENCE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION:
BALANCING INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND REGULATORY AUTONOMY (2015)
(examining how investment tribunals have balanced the competing interests of host
states and foreign investors in determining state liability in disputes concerning the
exercise of public power).
84
Allard v. Barbados, supra note 76, at ¶ 46; Peter Allard v. Barbados, PCA
Case No. 2012-06, Award, ¶ 84 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).
85 See Christoph Schreuer, Investment Protection and International Relations, in
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—LIBER AMICORUM HANSPETER NEUHOLD
345, 347 (August Reinisch & Ursula Kriebaum eds., 2007) (discussing the balancing
of interests of the parties concerned in arbitration); CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 416 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing advantages to each
party in arbitration).
86 See, e.g., Total S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case
ARB/04/1, ¶ 312 (Dec. 27, 2010); El Paso Energy International Company v.
Argentina, Award, ICSID Case ARB/03/15, ¶ 374 (Oct. 31, 2011); Charanne B.V.
Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v. Spain, Award, SCC ARB 062/2012, ¶ 490 (Jan.
21, 2016) (considering the importance of stabilization commitments for the
protection of investors’ expectations under the fair and equitable treatment
standard).
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for existing investments and adopt additional security requirements
if this is necessary to address new security risks.87 The dynamic
nature of geopolitics can help justify the need for regulatory changes
to the certification of an existing investment. Changes in alliances
and the deterioration of relations between the host state and the
home state affect the host state’s perception of security risk of
investments by SOEs, thus requiring regulatory intervention in
cases of foreign control over strategic assets.88
A key challenge to the justification of new security requirements
is that measures taken in the context of geopolitical tensions target
SOEs from non-allied states and treat them differently from
investors from allied states and national investors.89 These measures
are often “directed specifically against a certain investor by reason
of his, her or its nationality,” and thus raise questions of
compatibility with the investment protection standards of national
treatment, most favored nation, expropriation, and fair and
equitable treatment.90
In the EU energy sector, for instance, Russian investments are
seen with increasing suspicion in the context of deteriorating EU-

87
For instance, the “Gazprom clause” recognizes the “right of Member States
to exercise . . . national legal controls to protect legitimate public security interests”
and establishes the right of the EU Commission to request national authorities to
re-open a certification procedure. Concerning Common Rules for the Internal
Market in Natural Gas Art. 11, July 13, 2009, Directive 2009/73/EC, O.J. L211/94.
88 See Section II.B, infra.
89
Nationality-based difference in treatment also affects security reviews at the
pre-establishment stage. In Australia, for instance, the Foreign Investment Review
Board in 2016 rejected a bid by the Chinese state-owned company State Grid for the
network company Ausgrid on the basis of security concerns in the absence of a
partnership with a local investor, while North American bidders were allegedly
told that they would not be bound by the same security requirements. See Jamie
Freed, Australia Courts U.S., Canada After Rejecting Chinese Bids for Ausgrid, REUTERS
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-privatisationausgrid-idUSKCN11K07E [https://perma.cc/QH4J-7SLC].
90
Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 180
(Oct. 12, 2005). See also RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 200–01 (2012) (discussing various considerations
in defining differentiation); Andrea Bjorklund, National Treatment, in STANDARDS OF
INVESTMENT PROTECTION 29, 37 (August Reinisch ed., 2008) (claiming that NAFTA
Chapter 11 awards are leading jurisprudence in the area of national treatment
disputes, but that tribunals are nevertheless not uniform in how they decide
national treatment cases).
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Russian relations.91 According to the 2014 Energy Security Strategy,
the EU aims to reduce its dependency on Russian gas, which
currently amounts to more than one third of EU natural gas
However, Norwegian gas imports and energy
imports.92
investments are not a cause of concern, despite the fact that
Norwegian gas amounts to more than 30 percent of EU imports.93
Although de jure EU law remains neutral on the energy security
requirements of non-EU companies, there are clear risks of de facto
discrimination in the application of the Gazprom Clause, and EU
energy and competition law more generally.94 In the US, a Chinese
investor in wind energy production was forced in 2012 to divest its
investment in a wind energy farm based on security concerns
relating to its location in proximity of a military basis, while other
foreign energy investors in the same zone could allegedly continue
to operate their installations.95
Geopolitical analysis can help host states demonstrate that
foreign investors that are perceived to present a security risk are not
“in like circumstances” with domestic or other foreign investors in
the same sector or business because of the different geopolitical
circumstances that characterize these investments.96 By analyzing
the strategic use (infrastructure diplomacy) that certain states make
of foreign investments in strategic assets,97 the economic statecraft
and geopolitical theories explain how investments by the SOE of a

See Section II.B, infra.
European Commission, supra note 48, at 1.
93
EUROSTAT, EU Imports of Energy Products - Recent Developments (October
2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/EU_imports_of_energy_products__recent_developments#Main_suppliers_of_natural_gas_and_petroleum_oils_to_t
he_EU [https://perma.cc/2VUB-V5X5].
94 See Section II.B, infra. See also Cottier, et al., supra note 51, at 12 (discussing
the treatment of foreign service suppliers under the Gazprom Clause); Goldthau,
supra note 13, at 14 (discussing problems associated with unequal bargaining power
in gas pipeline infrastructure).
95
Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
96
Arbitral practice generally accepts that “only foreign and domestic
investments that raise similar public policy concerns should be compared.”
Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment
Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT. L. 48, 72 (2008).
97 See Section II.A, infra.
91
92
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non-allied state can be a “legitimate concern” for the host state.98
Moreover, the theory on the dynamic nature of geopolitics99 helps
explain how, following the deterioration of bilateral relations
between the host and home states, mitigating the security risks
associated with a strategic investment can be “a legitimate public
policy objective.”100
According to the economic statecraft and geopolitical theories, it
is a government’s perception of risk – and not necessarily a fully
rational and objective assessment of the geopolitical reality – that
can drive host state to intervene with investments of a specific SOE
in a strategic asset.101 Despite the objectivity of the arbitration
process, investment tribunals generally accept that a host state’s
perceived need of a certain policy can provide a legitimate reason
for regulatory intervention with investments.102 “Some measure of
inefficiency, a degree of trial and error, [and] a modicum of human
imperfection” are permissible.103
In the context of geopolitical tensions between the home and the
host state, the risk of arbitrary interference with investments from
98 See, e.g., Genin v. Est., ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 362, 370 (June
25, 2001) (discussing the importance of “legitimate concerns” and “legitimate public
purpose” for the assessment of state measures under the non-discrimination and
fair and equitable treatment standards). See also Kenneth Vandevelde, A Unified
Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 43, 54 (2010)
(explaining that reasonableness, one of the principles in determining fair and
equitable treatment standards, requires the conduct to be reasonably related to a
legitimate public policy objective).
99 See Section II.B, infra.
100
Vandevelde, A Unified Theory, supra note 98, at 54. See also Archer Daniels
Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. Mex., ICSID Case
No. ARB/(AF)/04/5, Award, ¶¶ 110–84 (Nov. 21, 2007); Corn Products Int’l, Inc.
v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility, ¶¶ 144–91
(Jan. 15, 2008) (both discussed in Paparinskis, supra note 11, at 271 as examples of
how “the broader controversies between the home and host States can be brought
back into the arbitral process.”).
101 See Section II.B, infra.
102 See, e.g., GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mex., UNCITRAL, ¶ 114 (Nov. 15, 2004)
(finding that Mexico’s perceived legitimate goal in favor of public policy, though
misguided, was not discriminatory); see also Martins Paparinskis, Good Faith and Fair
and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law, in GOOD FAITH AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 143 (Andrew D. Mitchell et al. eds., 2015)
(discussing the role of good faith in international investments).
103 See Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech, SCC Case No.088/2004, Partial Award, ¶
272 (Mar. 27, 2007) (holding that “some measure of inefficiency, a degree of trial
and error, [and] a modicum of human imperfection” are permissible).
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the home state is considerable. This risk is particularly acute for
SOEs because of their close link with, and thus perceived influence
on, the home state’s government. In principle, international
investment law protects foreign investors against politically
motivated measures.104 In Ampal-American Israel Corp. v. Egypt, a
2017 decision concerning state interference with a gas pipeline
investment in the context of geopolitical tensions between the
importing state (Israel) and the exporting state (Egypt), the tribunal
accepted to take into account the geopolitical context of the
dispute.105 The tribunal ruled on this basis that the termination of
the natural gas export agreement (the economic foundation of the
investment) constituted a disproportionate act and thus an unlawful
expropriation because Egypt “terminated the GSPA [export
agreement] at a time when many in Egypt voiced strong opposition
to the supply of gas to Israel.”106
Similarly, according to Cargill v. Mexico, “a measure . . . designed
to put pressure on the [home state’s government] will focus on those
who are likely to be able to influence the [home state’s] government
and, in this, there is no necessary relationship with economic
circumstances. In other words, ( . . . ) there is no link here between
the alleged difference-a difference in economic circumstances-and
the rationale and objective of the measure in question.”107
According to Waste Management v. Mexico, there can be no doubt that
“a deliberate conspiracy” against the foreign investment would
constitute a breach of a basic obligation of treatment.108 According
to Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, a “deliberate campaign to punish [a
104 See, e.g., Eureko B.V. v. Pol., UNCITRAL Arb., Partial Award, ¶ 46 (Aug.
19, 2005) (noting that the State Treasury Minister admitted his attempt to void an
investment agreement was politically motivated; Azurix Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶¶ 375, 378, 426 (July 14, 2006) (finding that “politicization
. . . is an element in the . . . determination that the fair and equitable standard has
been breached”); Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award,
¶¶ 500, 698 (July 18, 2008) (finding political motives behind termination of a
contract “were inconsistent with the Republic’s obligations”).
105
Ampal-American Israel Corp. v. Egypt, ICSID Case ARB/12/11, Decision
on Liability and Heads of Loss, ¶ 344 (Feb. 21, 2017).
106 Id.
107
Cargill, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, ¶¶ 209, 220
(Sept. 18, 2009).
108
Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, ¶
138 (Apr. 30, 2004).
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foreign investor for political reasons] must surely be the clearest
infringement one could find of the provisions and aims of the
Treaty.”109
Invoking the policy objective of mitigating the security risks
associated with strategic investments is thus not enough to justify
all measures taken by a state in the name of this policy.110 The
security measure must be “taken because of”111 the perceived security
risks characterizing the strategic investment, and not to achieve an
abstract objective,112 such as retaliating against the SOE to punish or
seek to influence the home state’s government.
By de-codifying the strategic behavior of states, geopolitical
analysis can help distinguish between reasonable and arbitrary
interference with strategic investments.
On the one hand,
geopolitical analysis highlights that, in the context of interstate
tensions, the host state can have genuine concerns that the SOE from
a non-allied state can make use of its control over a strategic asset,
such as energy, to undermine the host state’s national security (e.g.,
by interrupting energy supply).113 On this basis, regulatory

109
Dissenting Opinion of Daniel M. Price, in Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/18, Award (July 26, 2007), citing Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award, ¶ 123.
110
AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Hungary, ICSID ARB/07/22, Award, ¶
10.3.9 (Sept. 23, 2010). See also Jürgen Kurtz, Balancing Investor Protection and
Regulatory Freedom in International Investment Law: The Necessary, Complex and Vital
Search for State Purpose, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY
2013-2014 251, 279 (Andrea Bjorklund ed., 2015) (arguing that the tribunal in GAMI
v. Mexico failed to draw a distinction between Mexico’s general policy goals and the
specific “exercise of discretion when implementing that goal”).
111
Cargill, supra note 107, at ¶ 204.
112
Vandevelde, supra note 98, at 97; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A.
v. Mexico, ICSID Case ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 163 (May 29, 2003).
113
For instance, the WTO Panel in European Union and its Member States –
Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector (WT/DS476/R), 10 August 2018, ¶
7.1202, ruled that “foreign control of TSOs [Transmission System Operators] poses
a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of the EU society,
namely its security of energy supply.” The Panel came to this conclusion by
accepting the argument that “there is a real and true possibility, rather than a
merely hypothetical one, of foreign governments requiring or inducing foreign
controlled TSOs to undermine the European Union’s security of energy supply” (¶
7.1194) and considering that “[s]ince natural gas is transported by TSOs through
infrastructure, which is fixed and, at any given time, of finite quantity, it can
reasonably be inferred that there will be a significant impact on the supply of
natural gas, and hence energy, if a foreign government requires or induces even a
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interference with the SOE’s investment can be justified by the host
state’s perception that the specific security risk linked to a strategic
asset can materialize following the deterioration of bilateral
relations with a previously allied home state. On the other hand,
geopolitical analysis highlights how, in the context of interstate
disputes, the host state can be tempted to interfere with SOEs to
influence or retaliate against the home state. By protecting foreign
investments against regulatory measures that are motivated by
political considerations, investment arbitration provides a forum for
the depoliticization of investment disputes. Such a forum avoids
SOEs from becoming the victims of geopolitical tensions between
the home and host states.
The transparency of the host state’s relation with the foreign
investor can be a decisive factor in determining whether the host
state acted in good faith and with respect of due process.114 In cases
concerning the security risks of geopolitical investments, the issue
of transparency is delicate because of the sensitivity of the
information related to national security. However, there is no
reason why investors in strategic assets would not have the right to
benefit from basic procedural protections such as the right to be
informed of the security action against its investment, to be given
access to unclassified evidence on which the government relied to
make its decision on the need for additional security measures, and
to be afforded an opportunity to rebut that evidence.115 According
to Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic, the failure of the host state to
disclose the rationale underlying a discriminatory measure can

single or a few TSOs to violate their obligations under EU law or to act contrary to
their commercial interests” (¶ 7.1199).
114
Tecmed, supra note 112, at ¶ 154. See generally Maffezini v. Kingdom of
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, ¶ 83 (Nov. 13, 2000); MTD Equity v.
Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 163 (May 25, 2004);
Champion Trading Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9,
Award, ¶ 164 (Oct. 27, 2006); Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 84 (Feb. 6, 2007); PSEG Global, Inc. v. Republic of Turkey,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, ¶¶ 173–74 (Jan. 19, 2007) (discussing the
principle of transparency under international investment law). But see United
Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, BCSC 664, ¶¶ 68-70 (2001) (explaining the
insignificance of transparency problems in determining a certain international
investment issue).
115
Ralls Corporation v. CFIUS, supra note 95.
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amount to a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard.116
Moreover, arbitral tribunals can assess the extent to which the host
state informed the investor of the preconditions for an acceptable
solution to the perceived risk,117 such as entering into a partnership
with an investor from the host state or an allied State.118
Given the stress on objectivity that is supposed to govern the
arbitration process, the relevance of the host state’s perception of
risk to justify interference with investors is not self-evident.
Depending on the measure of deference that arbitral tribunals
provide to states, the application of objective legal criteria to the
assessment of security measures can impose important limitations
on the implementation of security policies. For instance, in AAPL v.
Sri Lanka,119 the tribunal examined the destruction by government
forces of an investment, a farm, that was allegedly used as an
operational center for separatist activities during the Tamil
insurgency against the government.120 Applying an objective
standard of vigilance of the state,121 the majority of the tribunal ruled
that the government should have tried peaceful communication
before undertaking military action against the investment.122 The
majority’s decision generated criticism for second-guessing the
116
Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, supra note 66, at ¶ 407. See also
MTD Equity, supra note 114, at ¶ 163 (highlighting the inconsistency between two
arms of government in implementing the legal framework to regulate the foreign
investment); Siemens, supra note 114, at ¶ 84; Tecmed, supra note 112, at ¶ 215
(discussing the disclosure by states of crucial information on the regulation of a
foreign investment).
117
Saluka, supra note 66, at ¶¶ 420–25.
118 See e.g., Andrew Ward & Jim Pickard, Hinkley Go-ahead after ‘National
Security’
Safeguards,
FIN.
TIMES
(Sept.
16,
2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/0cde26b6-7b66-11e6-b837-eb4b4333ee43
[https://perma.cc/3HPY-KVJT] (detailing Theresa May’s approval of the Hinkley
Deal and the new conditions and requirements accompanying the approval);
Francois De Beaupuy, U.K. Approves EDF’s £18 Billion Hinkley Point Nuclear Project,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201609-14/u-k-said-to-approve-edf-s-18-billion-pound-nuclear-project-it39ityn
[https://perma.cc/SN7X-ZTFS] (detailing the approval of Hinkley Point C and
Chinese involvement in the plan).
119
Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka, Award, ICSID Case
ARB/87/3 (June 27, 1990).
120 See Stephen Vasciannie, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Civil Strife: The
AAPL/Sri Lanka Arbitration, 34 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 332, 334 (1992).
121
AAPL, supra note 119, at ¶ 77.
122 Id. at ¶ 84.
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modalities and timing of a “strategic and highly sensitive security
operation to regain its sovereign control of the area of
insurgency.”123 By refusing to recognize that the government was
under a compelling sovereign duty to undertake action and by
rejecting its strategic decisions, the majority can be criticized for
unduly interfering with the exercise by the state of its sovereign
powers.124 Indeed, in determining whether a certain state of affairs
engages national security concerns, tribunals have good reasons to
“afford a measure of deference to states, principally on the basis that
states are best placed to determine whether the situation in their
territory engages these concerns.”125
In principle, the sovereign right of states to regulate and protect
critical infrastructure against security threats from foreign actors
must be respected. Provided that the host state can demonstrate
how investors of a certain origin can use control over a certain asset
to harm national security, such as interrupt energy supply, a certain
level of deference is due in the assessment of security measures.
Geopolitical analysis can provide a strong rationale for state
intervention by helping the host state to substantiate its perception
of risk relating to foreign ownership over a particular asset and the
home state’s potential strategic ambitions with that asset.

Samuel Asante, Dissenting Opinion in AAPL, supra note 119.
See Giuditta Cordero Moss, Full Protection and Security, in STANDARDS OF
INVESTMENT PROTECTION 131, 140 (August Reinisch ed., 2008) (suggesting that the
majority in AAPL applied the “due diligence” criterion in a controversial way);
Vasciannie, supra note 120, at 353.
125 Caroline Henckels, Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest: The
Role of the Standard of Review and the Importance of Deference in Investor-State
Arbitration, 4 J. INT. DISP. SETTLEMENT 197, 207 (2013) (arguing that appropriately
deferential approach to the standard of review from investment tribunals would
achieve a more balanced relationship between the protection of foreign investment
and the host state); see also Freya Baetens, Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality:
Determining Likeness in Human Rights and Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 279, 313 (Stephan Schill ed., 2010)
(suggesting that serious security concerns could justify discriminatory measures
even when there was an intent to discriminate against the particular investor based
on its nationality); GUS VAN HARTEN, SOVEREIGN CHOICES AND SOVEREIGN
CONSTRAINTS: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 89 (2013)
(reviewing arbitral decisions and finding that there are very few indicators of
restraint “based on the relative capacity of governments”).
123
124
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4.2. The “Essential Security Interest” Exception
In a case where an arbitral tribunal refuses to recognize the
government’s right to regulate geopolitical risk, a state can invoke
the “essential interest” clause, if applicable under the relevant BIT.
These clauses authorize states to derogate from their investment
protection obligations if it is necessary to protect their essential
interests.126 To qualify as an essential interest under international
law, the risk that foreign investments represent for national security
must meet the threshold set by investment tribunals.127
Arbitral Tribunals accept that economic emergencies, and not
just military security, can qualify as an essential security interest of
the state.128 In LG&E v. Argentina, the Tribunal highlighted that
economic problems can constitute an essential security interest,
because “When a State’s economic foundation is under siege, the
severity of the problem can equal that of any military invasion.”129
According to economic statecraft and geopolitical theories, the use
of investments for strategic purposes is sometimes a preferred
means of geopolitical combat to the exercise of military power.130
Following the LG&E decision, the security implications of
geopolitical investments can represent essential security interests, in
case the risk for the economy is sufficiently severe, for example a
blackout of the electricity system. The host state will have to
126 See William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INTL. L. 307, 349-354 (2008)
(describing NPM clauses that allow states to take actions otherwise inconsistent
with the treaty in certain situations, for example, the actions that are necessary for
the protection of essential security); see also Caterine Gibson, Beyond Self-Judgement:
Exceptions Clauses in US BITs, 38 FORDHAM INTL. L. J. 1 (2015) (analyzing and
suggesting exceptions clauses in the BIT for US negotiators).
127
UNCTAD, supra note 6, 72–102.
128
Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case
ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 175 (Sept. 5, 2008); see also William J. Moon, Essential Security
Interests in International Investment Agreements, 15 J. INTL. ECON. L. 481, 500 (2012)
(arguing that essential security interests are not triggered unless a host state’s
national security interests are at stake.).
129
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case ARB/02/1, Decision on
Liability, ¶ 238 (Oct. 3, 2006).
130
BLACKWILL & HARRIS, supra note 4, at 1–18; see also BALDWIN, supra note 1,
at 9 (discussing the implications of the rise in using geoeconomic policies in
addition or in place of traditional military power).
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demonstrate how the SOE from a non-allied country can use its
control over a strategic asset to threaten public security.
Threats to national security and the necessity to act to avoid
these threats must be established on the basis of objective criteria,
leaving little room for “measures of discretion,”131 unless the treaty
explicitly recognizes the right of the state to apply measures that are
non-compliant with the treaty in cases where compliance would be
harmful to the State’s essential interests.132 By allowing for “the
subjective evaluation of the State claiming the derogation,”133 the socalled “self-judging” clauses provide a strong basis for the
recognition of the states’ perception of security risk relating to the
control of strategic assets by certain investors. The role of arbitral
tribunals is limited to a good faith review of the contested state
measure, in particular of whether there is a rational basis for the
state’s invocation of the applicable essential security clause.134
Geopolitical analysis can help states to substantiate their concerns
regarding the control by certain states over strategic assets and
justify the connection between this perceived threat to national
security and the measures taken.

131
Oil Platform (Iran v U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 73 (November 2003).
See also Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
Law?, 16 EUR. J. INTL. L. 907, 926 (2006) ( . . . “some international courts provide states
with wider margins of discretion in security-related matters”); Lisa Bohmer,
Another Indian BIT Award Surfaces, Revealing Divergence between A Pair of Tribunals
with Respect to Application of “Essential Security” Clauses, Investment Arbitration
Reporter, Sept. 17, 2018, https://www.iareporter.com/articles/another-indian-bitaward-surfaces-revealing-divergence-between-a-pair-of-tribunals-with-respect-toapplication-of-essential-security-clauses/
[https://perma.cc/6TNR-UF6W]
(reporting on the Deutsche Telekom AG (DT) v. India BIT dispute). But see the
majority in CC/Devas Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited, and Telcom
Devas Mauritius Limited v. The Republic of India, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits,
Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016, ¶¶ 244–45 (“The Tribunal has also no difficulty in recognizing
the ‘wide measure of deference . . . ‘. National security issues relate to the existential
core of a State. An investor who wishes to challenge a State decision in that respect
faces a heavy burden of proof, such as bad faith, absence of authority or application
to measures that do not relate to essential security interests.”)
132
Stephan Schill & Robyn Briese, If the State Considers: Self-Judging Clauses in
International Dispute Settlement, 13 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 61, 63 (2009).
133 Id. at 68.
134
Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 126, at 379.
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5. CONCLUSION
The economic statecraft and geopolitical theories uncover
dimensions to investment making and protection that are most
relevant to investment law, but which cannot be fully understood
solely on a legal analysis of the investments. Certain states make use
of foreign investments to achieve geopolitical objectives (e.g.,
control over resources and exercise of influence in regions of
strategic importance) – a practice that is most developed in the
energy sector.
The geopolitical dimension of investments in strategic assets
raises security concerns for host states. So far, the investment law
literature has mostly focused on the role that national security
reviews play at the pre-establishment stage to address the threat that
foreign investments can represent for national interests. The
economic statecraft and geopolitical theories highlight that threats
to national security can occur after investments have been approved
and implemented. Although the geopolitical reality, such as the
strategic importance of resources and regions, is characterized by
relative stability, the states’ perception of risk and subsequent
strategic reaction can undergo rapid changes. As highlighted in the
context of the deterioration of EU-Russian relationship, the control
of strategic assets by an SOE holding the nationality of a country that
is perceived as hostile can be seen as an unacceptable risk to national
security that requires regulatory intervention. At the same time,
geopolitical tensions between the host and home states can expose
SOEs to politically motivated measures designed to punish or
influence the home state’s government.
Despite the objective to “remove investment disputes from the
intergovernmental political sphere,”135 investment arbitration, with
the help of geopolitical analysis, can discipline the regulatory
responses to the perceived security risks of strategic investments.
Following existing arbitral practice, SOEs are likely to benefit from
access to investment arbitration, including such cases where the
geopolitical dimension of their investments is obvious. The focus of
the tribunals on the commercial nature, rather than on the purpose,
of the investment activity to accept jurisdiction opens the door to the
arbitration of geopolitical and thus state-to-state disputes.
135
Aron Broches, Settlement of Investment Disputes, in SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD
BANK, ICSID AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 161,
163 (Aron Broches ed. 1995).
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However, the alternative of blocking access to arbitration based on
geopolitical considerations is unrealistic because it involves secondguessing the motivation of investors in projects that often involve a
complex mix of commercial and strategic objectives.
Economic statecraft and geopolitical theories are of limited
relevance for the host states’ defense on jurisdiction, but they can
provide support to justify regulatory interference with strategic
investments under the substantive standards of protection. From
the host state’s perspective, geopolitical arguments can be used as
objective indicators to justify regulatory intervention with investors
of a certain origin, and not with others. Moreover, the theory of
geopolitical change helps to explain how the deterioration of
interstate relations and changes to strategic alliances create new
security risks that, in certain circumstances, can require interfering
with the investors’ expectations of regulatory stability. These
objective legal arguments are particularly important for states that
are bound by investment treaties that do not contain a self-judging
essential security exception clause. The fact that security interests
are concerned supports a higher level of deference for the national
policy-maker.136 Assessing the availability of alternative, and less
harmful, security measures can impose an excessively high degree
of scrutiny on the exercise by the host state of its sovereign
regulatory powers.
From the perspective of investors, economic statecraft and
geopolitical theories contribute to disciplining state interference by
rationalizing the criteria on the basis of which security risks and
state measures can be evaluated. A certain degree of subjectivity in
the definition of a country’s national interests, and its foreign policy
actions, is unavoidable. External policy measures, to a large extent,
depend on the states’ perception of the geopolitical reality.
However, if security arguments remain subjective, states could be
“free to propose whatever explanation one deems fit”137 to justify a
strategic reorientation of their geopolitical objectives, such as its
external energy relations and, on this basis, to interfere with existing
foreign investments in strategic assets. Subjective arguments
relating to the perceived threat that specific foreign investments
pose to a country’s national security interests potentially open the
door to a very broad basis for state interference with these
investments. The use of geopolitical analysis under investment
136
137

See generally Henckels, supra note 125.
Guzzini, supra note 14, at 39.
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arbitration, for example on the security risks associated to national
dependence on certain exporters, the competition for resources, the
strategic use by states of investments by SOEs and the consequences
of geopolitical change, provide more objective indicators to
substantiate the risk that investments represent, or are perceived to
represent, for national security.
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